Abstract. Motivated by the problem of establishing a session key among parties based on the possession of certain credentials only, we discuss a notion of attribute-based key establishment. A number of new issues arise in this setting that are not present in the usual settings of group key establishment where unique user identities are assumed to be publicly available.
Introduction
In the context of group key establishment, protocol participants are typically modeled as Turing machines U 1 , . . . , U n , and a unique identifier for each protocol participant is assumed to be publicly known. This identifier is usually identified with U i and used to specify with whom a key is to be established. It can also be used to impose a virtual connection topology among participants, e. g., the construction of Burmester and Desdmedt in [8] arranges parties in a circle with neighborhood relations being determined by an ordering on the set of identifiers.
In this paper we consider a scenario where participants in a group key establishment aim at obtaining a common session key with partners having certain attributes, disregarding individual identities. This can, for instance, mean that a key is to be established with members of a department that have the right to negotiate agreements of a certain value. In a two-party setting it could mean that a member from the sales department wants to establish a key with anyone in human resources who is entitled to deal with healthcare issues, and the representative in human resources establishes keys only with any representative of a department committee. The essential point is that we do not distinguish between individual user identities, but each participant specifies the attributes she expects her partners to have and the session key should be available to users that meet all imposed conditions. Another scenario where attribute-based group key establishment seems interesting is a project in an enterprise (or crossing enterprise boundaries), where project team members need-read and/or write-access to data relevant for the task at hand. In such a scenario, a common key could be established among all members possessing the necessary attributes to work on a particular project, without resorting to individual user identities.
Shifting the focus from individual identities to the possession of attributes, privacy questions naturally arise: depending on the application context, it may be a design goal that users do not have to reveal which exact set of attributes they possess, but only the fact that they possess a qualified set. Consequently, treating a user's set of attributes as a substitute for a public identifier can be problematic. In the protocol below we address this problem through (i) a form of privacy reminiscent of attribute-based encryption with hidden ciphertext policy [17] and attribute-hiding predicate encryption [5, 13] , and (ii) through a form of deniability reminiscent of deniable group key establishment [3] .
Organization of the paper. For a general introduction to the topic of key establishment, we refer to the book [6] by Boyd and Mathuria. Throughout, we formalize our setting of attribute-based key establishment in Section 2 by adapting the group key establishment model in [4] (which in turn builds on [7, 14] ) appropriately; the replacement of unique identifiers for protocol participants with attribute sets raises some technical issues that are to be addressed here. As a technical tool, in Section 3 we start by defining an attribute-based variant of signcryption, a tool which might be of independent interest. We will then use this tool to devise a two-round solution in the random oracle model, based on an attribute-based signcryption scheme.
Related work. As prior work on attribute-based key establishment, Wang et al. ' s results in [22, 21, 20] can be mentioned. These three papers address a two-party scenario and suggest solutions for such a setting with [21] and without random oracles [22, 20] , respectively. After submission of the original manuscript of our paper in November 2009, further work related to attribute-based key establishment has been made available, evidencing a wider interest in this topic. In particular, Camenisch et al. [9] discuss Credential-Authenticated Key Exchange (CAKE), where a two-party key exchange is conditioned on the compatibility of credentials held by the involved parties. Unlike the approach taken below, on the technical side, Camenisch et al. build on Canetti's Universal Composability (UC) framework [10] . Gorantla et al. [12] suggest a notion of attribute-based authenticated key exchange, with the security being captured in an "oracle based" security model, similar to the model employed below. While the essential working horse in our approach is attribute-based signcryption, a main technical tool in [12] is a type of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), to which Gorantla et al. refer as encapsulation-policy attribute based KEM. Their paper presents a construction for deriving a secure attribute-based authenticated key exchange from such a key encapsulation mechanism, assuming the latter fulfills an appropriate security guarantee. In [2] , Birkett and Stebila consider predicate-based key authenticated exchange between two parties. Similarly as in [12] and below, an "oracle based" security model is used. The authors of [2] show how to achieve both credential privacy and session key security by combinining a suitable predicate-based signature scheme with a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Security model
By we denote the security parameter, and by U ⊆ {0, 1}
O(1) a non-empty constant-size universe of attributes.
Communication model and adversarial capabilities
Participants and initialization. The set of potential protocol participants in an attribute-based group key establishment are probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) Turing machines labeled with subsets of U, and in slight abuse of terminology we will speak of a "protocol participant U ", identifying a Turing machine with its unique label. Analogously as in attribute-based encryption, an identifier U ∈ 2 U represents any user having exactly the attributes contained in U ; we do not distinguish among users possessing identical attributes. During a trusted initialization phase, a master key mk is chosen and used to derive the public system parameters pk as well as secret (attribute) keys ak U for each U ∈ 2 U . The secret key ak U is stored by protocol participant U as long-term secret.
Each protocol participant U may execute a polynomial number of protocol instances in parallel, and we will refer to instance s of protocol participant U ∈ 2 U as Π 
Remark 1. Note that the role of pid s U differs from "ordinary" authenticated key establishment: we interpret pid s U as access structure specifying the qualified sets of attributes, which in turn may be regarded as representing acceptable communciation partners. In particular, for a successful protocol execution we will not impose that all U ∈ pid s U participate-but only U ∈ pid s U may obtain the established session key. In a threshold-based setting, pid s U could consist of all subsets of U with cardinality greater than some threshold.
Communication network. We assume that arbitrary point-to-point connections among parties are available. As connections are under adversarial control (cf. the adversarial model below), the network is non-private and fully asynchronous. In particular, when broadcasting a message, this means that the adversary can create a situation where the protocol participants receive in fact different messages or only a subset of the participants receives the message.
Adversarial capabilities. The adversary A is modeled as ppt time Turing machine and considered to be active: A has full control of the communication network and may delay, eavesdrop, suppress, alter and insert messages at will. To make the adversarys capabilities explicit, the subsequently listed oracles are used and can be invoked by A: U is an access structure and b ∈ {init, init} is a role flag. In this way the adversary can initialize a protocol run among principals U such that each U ∈ B. The flag b allows to designate a protocol initiator whose computations may differ from those of other protocol participants. After such a query, Π s U 's pid s U -value is initialized to B, the used s U -flag is set and Π s U processes the first step of a protocol execution. This means that in this session, U aims at establishing a common key with at least one principal U ∈ B \ {U }. Reveal(U, s) yields the session key sk s U provided that it is defined, i. e., if acc s U = true and sk s U = null. Otherwise the distinguished null-value is returned. Corrupt(U ) reveals the long-term secret key ak U of U to the adversary. Given a concrete protocol run, involving instances Π s U , we say that user U is honest if and only if no query of the form Corrupt(U ) has been made by the adversary. Test(U, s) Only one query of this form is allowed for the adversary A. Provided that sk s U is defined, (i. e., acc s U = true and sk s U = null), A can execute this oracle query at any time when being activated. A test bit t ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random and if t = 0 then the session key sk s U is returned. If t = 1, then a uniformly chosen random session key is returned.
Protocol goals
Correctness. This property expresses that in the absence of adversarial interference, the protocol will establish a common key along with a matching identifier: Definition 1 (Correctness). An attribute-based group key establishment is correct if on honest delivery of all messages and all users being honest, a single protocol execution among users V ⊆ 2 U involves instances Π s U U (U ∈ V) such that with overwhelming probability all of the following hold:
-all users in V accept, i. e., acc s U U = true for all U ∈ V; -all users in V obtain the same session identifier, i. e., sid s U U is identical for all U ∈ V; -all users in V accept the same session key, i. e., sk s U U is identical and =null for all U ∈ V; -all communication partners are specified as desired communication partner, i. e., V ⊆ pid
Correctness alone is a rather weak guarantee, as it refers to a scenario where no attack takes place. For instance, the last condition ensures that every protocol participant is aware that the users in V may know the session key, but no statement is made about the session key being known to users in U \ Vactually, broadcasting the session key to all users is not ruled out by correctness.
To formalize security guarantees, we use the following terminology.
Partnering and freshness We have to specify under which circumstances a Testquery may be executed and under which circumstances a correct guess of the adversary constitutes a viable attack. To do so, we fix the following notions of partnering and freshness.
Definition 2 (Partnering). We say that two instances
The notion of partnering is mainly a technical tool, but crucial for capturing the the intuition of a secure key establishment adequately. An adversary is restricted to attacking fresh instances, and for an instance to be fresh, in particular no partnered instance must have been queried to the Reveal oracle: With the above terminology we can capture (semantic) security of an attributebased key establishment protocol P in the usual way. For an adversary A attacking an attribute-based key establishment protocol P , we define an advantage function Adv A = Adv A ( ) by setting Adv A := |Succ sem A − 1/2|, where Succ sem A is the probability that the adversary queries the Test oracle on a fresh instance Π s U and guesses correctly the test bit t used by the Test oracle.
Definition 4 (Semantic security).
We call an attribute-based group key establishment secure if for any ppt adversary A the function Adv A = Adv A ( ) is negligible.
Remark 2. According to our freshness definition, an adversary is allowed to corrupt all remaining honest parties right before quering Test without violating freshness. Thus the above definition of semantic security implies forward security in the usual sense: even after having access to all longterm secrets of users, session keys remain indistinguishable from random keys.
In addition to these standard security goals, we adapt the notion of integrity from [4] , which can be seen as a correctness guarantee in the presence of an active adversary:
Definition 5 (Integrity). We say that a correct attribute-based group key establishment fulfills integrity if with overwhelming probability all instances of honest parties U , U that have accepted with the same session identifier sid Another possible protocol goal for an attribute-based key establishment is to reveal not more information about the identity of participating users than actually needed: if a user U specifies a particular access structure in a pid s U -value, there is no immediate need to reveal which particular qualified subset of attributes is used by a communication partner. For instance, if U wants to be sure that its communication partner posseses at least the attributes u 1 , u 2 ∈ U, U does not have to know which other attributes a communication partner has in addition to u 1 and u 2 . In this paper we do not offer a formalization of such a guarantee, but in Section 4 will discuss our proposed protocol from this point of view. There, we will also address the question of deniability for our protocol: to what extent it is possible to provide convincing evidence to a third party about the involvement of a particular U ∈ 2 U in a protocol execution.
Attribute-based signcryption
Our definition and security model for attribute-based signcryption is modeled after the discussion of standard signcryption by An et al. in [1] . To formalize attribute-based encryption and attribute-based signing, we build on the work by Sahai and Waters [18] and Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini [19] respectively.
Definition 6 (Attribute-based encryption). An attribute-based encryption scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms (Setup, Gen, Enc, Dec):
Setup is probabilistic and run by a trusted authority: on input the security parameter 1 and a universe of attributes U, a master secret key mk and public system parameters pm are generated. The public parameters include a description of the message space M. Gen is probabilistic and run by a trusted authority: on input the master secret key mk and a set of attributes U belonging to a user, a secret key dk U for these attributes is generated. Enc is probabilistic and run by a user who wants to send a plaintext message m to a user with a set of attributes in the access structure A: on input m ∈ M and A ⊆ 2 U , this algorithm generates a ciphertext c. Dec is a deterministic algorithm run by a user with a set of attributes U ⊆ U.
On input c and dk U , this algorithm outputs the underlying plaintext m, if c is a valid encryption of m and U is contained in the access structure A specified in the computation of c. Otherwise an error symbol ⊥ is returned.
For our purposes, where only uniformly at random chosen plaintexts are encrypted, a rather basic security guarantee will be sufficient:
Definition 7 (One-Wayness for attribute-based encryption). For a ppt adversary A, denote by Adv OW-CPA A the probability that A wins the game described in Figure 1 . We refer to an attribute-based encryption scheme as OW-CPA secure in the selective access structure model, if Adv
( ) is negligible for all ppt adversaries A. Example 1. For access structures describing qualified subsets through a threshold, we can employ Sahai and Waters' pairing-based construction in [18] to achieve security in the sense of Definition 7.
A natural approach to derive an attribute-based signcryption scheme as needed for our key establishment protocol, is to compose an OW-CPA secure attributebased encryption scheme with an existentially unforgeable attribute-based signature scheme:
Definition 8 (Attribute-based signature). An attribute-based signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms (Setup, Gen, Sig, Ver):
Setup is probabilistic and run by a trusted authority: on input the security parameter 1 and a universe of attributes U, a master secret key mk and public system parameters pm are generated. The public parameters include a description of the message space M.
Init phase Given the security parameter 1 , the adversary A outputs: -a non-empty set U , the universe of attributes; -a non-empty access structure A ⊆ 2 U that it wants to be challenged upon. Setup phase The challenger runs Setup and hands the public parameters to A. Query phase 1 The adversary is allowed to ask (adaptively) queries for -private decryption keys dkU for attribute sets U ⊆ U subject to the restriction U / ∈ A. Challenge phase The challenger picks a message m uniformly at random from the message space and hands the resulting ciphertext Enc(m, A) to the adversary A. 1 We assume that all plaintext messages m ∈ M have the same length. Gen is probabilistic and run by a trusted authority: on input the master secret key mk and a set of attributes U belonging to a user, a secret key sk U for these attributes is generated. Sig is probabilistic and run by a user who wants to sign a message m with his secret key sk U : on input m ∈ M and sk U , this algorithms generates a signature σ. Ver is deterministic and run by a user who wants to verify if a signature has been created by a user with a set of attributes in the verification access structure B: on input a message m, a signature σ and an access structure B ⊆ 2 U , this algorithm outputs true if σ is a valid signature for m under sk U for some U ∈ B. Otherwise the algorithm outputs false. Example 2. For access structures describing qualified subsets through a threshold, we can employ Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini's pairing-based construction in [19] to achieve security in the sense of Definition 9.
Given the above terminology, the following definition of an attribute-based signcryption scheme seems a natural one, and below we will argue that a generic way to obtain such a signcryption scheme is provided by an attribute-based variant of the encrypt-then-sign paradigm.
Definition 10 (Attribute-based signcryption). An attribute-based signcryption scheme is a tuple (Setup, Gen, Signcrypt, Unsigncrypt) of polynomial time algorithms:
Init phase Given the security parameter 1 , the adversary A outputs:
-a non-empty set U , the universe of attributes. Setup phase The challenger runs Setup and hands the public parameters to A. Query phase The adversary is allowed to ask (adaptively) queries for:
-private keys for attribute sets U ; -signatures of a signer with attribute set U on a message m. Forgery phase The adversary outputs a tuple (µ, σ, A), where µ is a message and A is an access structure. The adversary wins if and only if Ver(µ, σ, A) = true and the following restrictions on the queries in the challenge phase hold: -all attribute sets U asked in private key queries satisfy U / ∈ A; -all inputs of signature queries satisfy m = µ or U / ∈ A. Setup is probabilistic and run by a trusted authority: on input the security parameter 1 and a universe of attributes U, a master secret key mk and public system parameters pm are generated. The public parameters include a description of the message space M. Gen is probabilistic and run by a trusted authority: on input the master secret key mk and a set of attributes U belonging to a user, a secret key ak U for these attributes is generated. Signcrypt is probabilistic and run by a user who wants to send a plaintext message m authenticated with his secret key ak U for the set of attributes U to a user with a set of attributes in the access structure A: on input m ∈ M, ak U and A ⊆ 2 U , this algorithm generates a signcryption s. Unsigncrypt is deterministic and run by a user with a set of attributes U and expecting a message that is authenticated with a set of attributes in the verification access structure B: on input s, ak U and B, this algorithm outputs the underlying plaintext m, if s is a valid signcryption authenticated by some U ∈ B and such that U is contained in the access structure A specified in the computation of s. Otherwise, an error symbol ⊥ is returned.
We impose the obvious correctness condition:
for all U ∈ B and U ∈ A.
Similarly as for ordinary signcryption, we consider two security requirements for attribute-based signcryption and formalize these requirements separately. The first security requirement refers to confidentiality:
Definition 11 (One-wayness for attribute-based signcryption). For a ppt adversary A, denote by Adv OWS-CPA A the probability that A wins the game described in Figure 3 . An attribute-based signcryption scheme is OWS-CPA secure in the selective access structure model, if Adv -a non-empty set U , the universe of attributes; -a non-empty access structure A ⊆ 2 U and an attribute set U ∈ 2 U that it wants to be challenged upon. Setup phase The challenger runs Setup and hands the public parameters to A. Query phase 1 The adversary is allowed to ask (adaptively) queries for -private keys for attribute sets U ⊆ U subject to the restriction U / ∈ A. -signcryptions sm := Signcrypt(m, ak U , A) with m being chosen uniformly at random by the challenger. Both m and sm are returned to the adversary.
2
Challenge phase The challenger picks uniformly at random a plaintext message m and signcrypts m using ak U and A. 2 The resulting signcryption s := Signcrypt(m, ak U , A) is handed to A. Query phase 2 Identical to Query phase 1. Guess phase The adversary outputs a guess m for the plaintext m underlying the signcryption s and wins if and only if m = m . 2 We assume that all plaintext messages m ∈ M have the same length. Similarly, we can capture the desired authenticity guarantee of an attributebased signcryption scheme:
Definition 12 (Existential unforgeability for attribute-based signcryption). For a ppt adversary A, denote by Adv
UFS-CMAA A the probability that A wins the game described in Figure 4 . An attribute-based signcryption scheme is secure in the sense of UFS-CMAA, if the advantage Adv Discussing the problem of dedicated constructions for attribute-based signcryption is outside the scope of this paper, but the following proposition gives a generic way to obtain a signcryption scheme as used in our protocol through a composition of suitable signature and encryption schemes. In particular, for a threshold setting we can build on the schemes of Sahai/Waters [18] and Shahandashti/Safavi-Naini [19] .
Definition 13 (Attribute-based encrypt-then-sign).
Let E = (Setup E , Gen E , Enc, Dec) be an attribute-based encryption scheme and S = (Setup S , Gen S , Sig, Ver) be an attribute-based signature scheme. Then we define the encrypt-then-sign (EtS) signcryption scheme as follows:
Setup runs, on input the security parameter 1 and a universe of attributes U,
both Setup E (1 , U) and Setup S (1 , U), resulting in two key pairs (mk E , pm E ) and (mk S , pm S ). The returned master key is the pair mk := (mk E , mk S ) and the public parameters are pm := (pm E , pm S ).
Init phase Given the security parameter 1 , the adversary A outputs: -a non-empty set U , the universe of attributes. Setup phase The challenger runs Setup and hands the public parameters to A. Query phase The adversary is allowed to ask (adaptively) queries for:
-private keys for attribute sets U ; -signcryptions of a signer with attribute set U on a message m with an access structure D Forgery phase The adversary outputs a tuple (µ, s, U , A), where µ is a message, U is a set of attributes, the secret key of which can be used to unsigncrypt and A is a verification access structure. The adversary wins if and only if s is a valid signcryption of µ that can be unsigncrypted with ak U and A, and the following restrictions on the queries in the challange phase hold: -all attribute sets U asked in private key queries satisfy U / ∈ A; -all inputs of signcryption queries satisfy m = µ or U / ∈ A.
Fig. 4. UFS-CMAA: existential unforgeability of an attribute-based signcryption scheme
Gen runs, on input an attribute set U ∈ 2 U , both Gen E and Gen S and combines the resulting secret keys dk U and sk U to the secret key ak U := (dk U , sk U ) for the attribute set U . Signcrypt receives a message m, a secret key ak U = (dk U , sk U ) and an access structure A as input. The returned value is Signcrypt(m, ak U , A) := (c, V, Sig(c V, sk U )) where c := Enc(m, A) and V ∈ A arbitrary. Unsigncrypt receives a signcryption (c, V, σ), a secret key ak U = (dk U , sk U )
for an attribute set U and a verification access structure B as input. The returned value is
The following theorem says that EtS inherits security guarantees from the comprising component schemes.
Theorem 1.
Let S be an attribute-based signature scheme that is secure in the sense of UF-CMAA, and let E be an attribute-based encryption scheme that is secure in the sense of OWS-CPA. Then EtS is secure in the sense of both OWS-CMAA and OWS-CPA.
Proof. We prove the two security guarantees for EtS separately.
UF-CMAA security: Let A be a forger for the EtS signcryption scheme. We use A to construct a forger A for the signature scheme S such that Adv
. The public parameters pm = (pm E , pm S ) for A can be provided by A by using its own public parameters pm S and by running Setup E to obtain pm E . Note that A also knows the master key mk E corresponding to pm E . To reply to signcryption and key extraction queries, A can proceed as follows.
Private key queries To extract the secret key ak U = (dk U , sk U ) for an attribute set U , A queries its own key extraction oracle to obtain sk U and runs Gen E with input mk E and U to obtain a decryption key dk U . Signcryption queries If A queries for a signcryption on a message m with attribute set U and access structure D, A computes the ciphertext c := Enc(m, D) and queries its signing oracle for a signature σ on c V with attribute set U , where V ∈ D is chosen arbitrarily. Then (c, V, σ) is a valid reply to the signcryption query of A . Suppose A produces a successful forgery (µ, (c, V, σ), U , A) for EtS, as specified in the UFS-CMAA game in Figure 4 . Then A outputs the tuple (c V, σ, A) as forgery for the signature scheme S. We have to argue why this is indeed a forgery meeting the requirements of the UF-CMAA game in Figure 2 :
-By definition of EtS's Unsigncrypt algorithm, we have Ver(c V, σ, A) = true. -Private key queries: as (µ, (c, V, σ), U , A) is a successful forgery for EtS, all queried attribute sets U are such that U / ∈ A. -Signature queries: for a valid forgery, all signcryption queries (m, U, D)
of A satisfy m = µ or U / ∈ A. m = µ: suppose that A has submitted c V to its signing oracle earlier.
Then c = Enc(m, D) for some access structure D such that V ∈ D.
As Dec is deterministic, this implies Dec(c, dk V ) = m and c cannot be a valid encryption of µ = m under an access structure containing V . Consequently, A has never sent c V to its signing oracle. U / ∈ A: then the signature query (c V, U ) satisfies U / ∈ A, and A's forgery is valid. Summarizing, we have Adv
as desired. OWS-CPA security: Let A be an adversary in the OWS-CPA game for the EtS.
We use A to construct an adversary A winning the OW-CPA game for the encryption scheme E with Adv
is non-negligible. For this, A outputs the same set of attributes U and the same access structure A as output by A in the init phase. The public parameters pm = (pm E , pm S ) for A can be provided by A by using its own public parameters pm E and by running Setup S to obtain pm S . Note that A also knows the master key mk S corresponding to pm S . To reply to signcryption and key extraction queries, A can proceed as follows. Private key queries To extract the secret key ak U = (dk U , sk U ) for an attribute set U , A queries its own key extraction oracle to obtain dk U and runs Gen S with input mk S and U to obtain a signing key sk U . Signcryption queries Whenever A requests a signcryption with attribute set U and access structure A, A computes the ciphertext c := Enc(m, A) with a uniformly at random chosen m, and in particular can return the plaintext m to A as needed. The signcryption returned to A is obtained as (c, V, Sig(c V, sk U )) with V ∈ A arbitrary and U being the identity specified by A in the first part of the OWS-CPA game-A can compute sk U as sk U = Gen S (mk S , U ).
In the challenge phase, A hands (c, V, Sig(c V, sk U )) with V ∈ A arbitrary to A , where c is A's OW-CPA challenge ciphertext. The value returned by A is the plaintext returned by A . Obviously A wins the OW-CPA game if and only if A returns the correct plaintext underlying A's OW-CPA challenge, and we have Adv
A two-round protocol
Given an attribute-based signcryption scheme (Setup,Gen, Signcrypt,Unsigncrypt) and a random oracle H(·), Figure 5 describes a two-round protocol for attributebased key establishment. To simplify readability, we do not explicitly mention the instance number of protocol instances Π s U and refer, e g., to the session key simply as sid U (instead of sid s U ).
Round 1:
Computation Each user U chooses kU ∈ {0, 1} and xU ∈ {1, . . . , ord(g)} at random and computes yU := g x U . In addition, the initiator U init chooses r ∈ {0, 1} at random and computes c := Signcrypt(kU init , akU init , pid U init ).
Computation Each user U unsigncrypts c using the secret key akU and verification access structure pid U . If this yields the error symbol ⊥ or pid U init pid U or U ∈ pid U init , then U aborts. Otherwise kU init := Unsigncrypt(c, akU , pid U ), and U orders the received k U -values, including kU init , lexicographically 3 . Thus, U can index the k U s as k0 < · · · < kn−1 and label users and y-values from Round 1 according to ki as Ui and yi. To simplify notation, we assume w. l. o. g. that k0 = kU init . Taking indices mod n, each Ui computes the values t L i := H(y
L n−1 j=i Xj, computes r and checks if the commitment H(r) from Round 1 is correct. If any check fails, the protocol is aborted. Key derivation Each participant Ui computes the session key skU i = H(r k0 k1 · · · kn−1 pid U 0 0) and the session identifier sidU i = H(r k0 k1 · · · kn−1 pid U 0 1).
3 If the ki-values are not pairwise different, U aborts the protocol. It is worth noting that the computations performed by the protocol initiator deviate slightly from those performed by the other parties. In particular, the protocol initiator U 0 is the only party running the Signcrypt algorithm-all other protocol participants apply Unsigncrypt instead. The following result identifies the protocol as a secure attribute-based key establishment-provided the underlying attribute-based signcryption scheme offers appropriate guarantees and the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the CDH assumption holds for the group generated by g, H(·) is a random oracle, and the attribute-based signcryption scheme used in Figure 5 is secure in the sense of OWS-CPA and UFS-CMAA. Then the protocol in Figure 5 is a correct attribute-based key establishment that is secure in the sense of Definition 4 and fulfills integrity in the sense of Definition 5.
Proof. Correctness is obvious, and we can restrict to showing security and integrity. For this, let q s and q ro be polynomial upper bounds for the number of the adversary A's queries to the Send respectively the random oracle. We begin by defining four events that occur throughout the proof, and we give negligible upper bounds for the probabilities of these events to occur.
Collision is the event that the random oracle produces a collision. A Send query causes at most 5 random oracle calls. Thus, the total number of random oracle queries is bounded by 5q s + q ro and the probability that a collision of the random oracle occurs is
which is negligible in . Decrypt is the event that the adversary A succeeds in recovering a random message k U init from a signcryption c with secret key ak U init and access structure pid U init , without having queried Corrupt(U ) for any U ∈ pid U init and without having queried Reveal for the respective instance of U init . An adversary A that can reach Decrypt can be used to construct an adversary C violating the OWS-CPA security of the signcryption scheme: C guesses the access structure pid U init , the attribute set U init as well as the respective instance of U init uniformly at random. As U has constant size, this guess is correct with probability ≥ 1/p for some polynomial p = p( ). If any of the guessed values is incorrect, then C aborts. In case of everything being guessed correctly, pid U init and U init form the access structure and the set of attributes that C has to specify in the Init phase of the OWS-CPA game. All of A's oracle queries can be simulated in the obvious way by C, and we obtain
Thus, the event Decrypt occurs with negligible probability only.
Forge is the event that A succeeds in forging a signcryption c of a message k U init for attribute set U init and access structure pid U init without having queried Corrupt(U init ) and where k U init was not output by any of U init 's instances. An adversary A that can reach Forge can be used for forging a signcryption: the tuple (k U init , s, U init , {U init }) would constitute a valid forgery, since s = Signcrypt(k U init , ak U init , pid U init ), so it can be unsigncrypted successfully with with the secret key of U init and the verification access structure {U init }.
Moreover, there has not been any private key query of U init (no Corrupt(U init )) nor a signcryption query of (k U init , U init , pid U init ) (k U init was not output by any of U init 's instances). Thus, using A as a black box we obtain an attacker B defeating the existential unforgeability of the underlying signcryption scheme with advantage Adv
By assumption Adv
is negligible, and we see that Forge occurs with negligible probability only. Repeat is the event that an uncorrupted participant chooses a nonce k i or r that was previously used by an oracle of some party. There are at most q s used instances that may have chosen a nonce k i or r, and thus the event Repeat occurs with probability
which again is negligible in . TestCorrupt is the event that a participant U i of a Test session with fresh instances has been corrupted, and U i accepted the session key. According to the definition of freshness, U i was not corrupted yet, when sending its Round 2 message (X i , i) to the other protocol participants. Consequently, X i was, with overwhelming probability, computed without knowledge of t L i and t R i -for computing the latter either the event Collision or Decrypt had to occur. As a consequence the r-value r recovered by U i satisfies H(r ) = H(r) with negligible probability only. Therefore, with overwhelming probability, U i aborted the protocol without accepting the session key, and we recognize P (TestCorrupt) as negligible.
Security. To prove security according to Definition 4, we use the usual game hopping technique, letting the adversary A interact with a simulator. In Game 0, the simulator offers the original protocol environment to A, but subsequently we change the simulator's behavior in several small steps without affecting A's success probability significantly. Keeping track of the changes between subsequent games, in the last game we will be able to establish a negligible upper bound on Adv A . We denote the advantange of A in Game i by Adv
Game 0: In this game, the simulator faithfully simulates all protocol participants' instances for the adversary A, i. e., the adversary's situation is the same as in the real model: Uj are selected by randomly choosing two different users U i , U j ∈ 2 U plus two numbers s i , s j ∈ {1, . . . , q s }. Game 2 only differs from Game 1, if at least one session is set up of uncorrupted users. To distinguish the games, the adversary has to query the random oracle with at least one Diffie-Hellman key, established between neighbors in a session with uncorrupted participants. These randomly chosen instances will be those neighbored participants with probability at
Ui and Π sj Uj such that these instances will use y i := g a respectively y j := g b in Round 1. If at some point now Π si Ui and Π sj Uj do not qualify any longer to be neighbored participants in a session with only uncorrupted users, the simulation is aborted. Then a random index z ∈ {1, . . . , q ro } is chosen and the adversary's z-th query to the random oracle is taken for the answer to the CDH challenge. The answer to the CDH challenge is correct if A distinguished the games with the chosen instances and also the index z was guessed correctly:
where Succ ( g ,g) is an upper bound for the success probability of the above algorithm to solve the CDH problem in group generated by g, using generator g. In particular, under the CDH assumption and with U having constant size, the right-hand side of this inequality is negligible in . Game 3: In this game the simulator changes the computation of the session key:
having received all messages of Round 2 for an instance Π si Ui , the simulator checks if all U j ∈ pid si Ui are uncorrupted and if Reveal has not been queried with an instance Π sj Uj ∈ pid si Ui . If this is the case the simulator chooses a session key sk si Ui ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random instead of querying the random oracle. For consistency, the simulator will assign the same key to all partnered instances. To detect the difference to the previous game, the adversary must query the random oracle for H(r k 0 . . . k n 1). About r only H(r) and e = k 0 ⊕ r ⊕ t R 0 are known. Thus, the adversary can only guess a random value for r and query the random oracle at most q ro times, or can get the value r if it can invert the signcryption c to get k 0 and can get t R 0 . This results in:
All participants involved in the Test session are uncorrupted, and none the instances involved in the Test query have been revaled. Therfore, those instances are affected by the modification just introduced, i. e., they use random session keys. Consequently Adv Integrity. Let U i and U j be any two honest principals whose instances Π Uj have with overwhelming probability the same value pid U0 . As the tests in Round 2 succeeded, we see that U i ∈ pid U0 and U j ∈ pid U0 . Moreover, we have pid U0 ⊆ pid Ui ∩ pid Uj . Thus U i ∈ pid Uj and U j ∈ pid Ui with overwhelming probability.
Further protocol properties
The protocol in the previous section has a number of characteristics, that seem to be worth commenting. We do not formalize these properties here, and consequently these comments should not be taken as provable guarantees, but rather as issues that might deserve further (formal) exploration in future work:
Key agreement. The protocol is contributory in the sense that each party influences the value of the final session key by its input, and no proper subset of protocol participants can enforce a particular predetermined session key: parties U other than the initiator U init have to publish their contribution k i before learning the random value r, i. e., parties U can actually not fix any bit in the session key. The initiator U init can mount a rushing attack, however: before fixing r, U init knows all inputs to the key derivation. Because of the application of the random oracle in the derivation of the session key, U init 's potential to manipulate the value of the session key is still rather limited and reduces to quering the random oracle with different r-values. If a stronger guarantee is desired, the following approach (see [16, 4] ) seems worth being explored: in Round 1, users U = U init broadcast H(k i ) instead of k i -and these hash value then form the basis to fix an ordering among protocol participants. The actual values k 1 , . . . , k n−1 would then be included in the Round 2 messages and checked for consistency with the Round 1 commitments.
Plausible deniability. Protocol transcripts generated by initiator U init alone are indistinguishable from real protocol transcripts: even after revealing all secret keys, including the master keys, U init cannot provide evidence of any other parties' active involvement in a protocol execution, as secret user keys ak U with U = U init are only used to recover values signcrypted by U init .
Privacy. As just noted, parties U = U init use their secret keys only for recovering values signcrypted by the initiator U init . At no point in the protocol do those parties have to make their attributes explicit; only the fact that U is contained in the access structure pid U init used to create the signcryption in Round 1 has to be revealed.
Conclusion
In this paper we discussed a notion of attribute-based key establishment and provided a two-round solution, building on an attribute-based signcryption scheme offering a basic form of security. The discussion of attribute-based signcryption might be of independent interest, and, as shown, such a signcryption scheme can be derived from suitable attribute-based signature and encryption schemes, using the encrypt-then-sign paradigm. We think that our discussion raises a number of questions that deserve follow-up work-like the question of dedicated constructions for attribute-based signcryption schemes or the use of a form of attribute-based key-encapsulation with the proposed protocol.
